Leeds provisional assessment pilot – Update

I previously expressed some concern as to whether those judges dealing with provisional assessments in the new Leeds assessment pilot would be sufficiently familiar with the minutia of legal costs law.

Those concerns have been somewhat reduced as I understand that all the provisional assessments will be done by one of two Regional Costs Judges (District Judge Bedford and District Judge Hill). Nevertheless, can they really both be expected to be walking legal costs encyclopaedias?

In one recent set of Replies I received the following cases were referred to: Bailey v IBC Vehicles Ltd, Cole v News Group Newspapers, Carpenter v Mid-Kent Healthcare Trust, William Patterson v Cape Darlington & Ors, Mattel Inc & Ors v RSW Group plc, Ghannouchi v Houni, Francis v Francis and Dickerson, Smith Graham v The Lord Chancellor’s Department and Crane v Canons Leisure Centre. I am going to hazard a guess and suggest that there is at least one case in there that the judges will not be familiar with. (Actually, it was fairly clear that the author of the Replies was not familiar with all these cases.) This sends us back to the problem that costs pleadings in the pilot courts are likely to explode in length as parties feel it essential to do more than simply quote the name of a case.

The second interesting issue is what happens if the pilot is a success? We know it is intended to be rolled out nationally if successful. If so, will it be only Regional Costs Judges involved? The danger would be that a successful pilot scheme undertaken by two experienced Regional Costs Judges is then extended nationally and provisional assessments are undertaken by judges who may know little or nothing about costs, resulting in chaos.

The answer would be to introduce what I have been advocating for years but what did not seem to interest Lord Justice Jackson, namely one or more regional Senior Courts Costs Offices. In a post-fast-track fixed fee world (that is surely rapidly approaching) there would probably need to be only one extra court in the North to compliment the one in London. Let’s give legal costs the judicial expertise it demands.
 

County Court Provisional Assessment Pilot

Now that we’ve all had the chance to consider the new rules for the County Court Provisional Assessment Pilot, which starts on 1 October 2010, lets make sure we are all familiar with the details.

CPD 40.12 appears to continue to apply:

The following provisions apply in respect of the papers to be filed in support of the bill;

(a) If the claim is for costs only without any additional liability the papers to be filed, and the order in which they are to be arranged are as follows:

(i) instructions and briefs to counsel arranged in chronological order together with all advices, opinions and drafts received and response to such instructions;

(ii) reports and opinions of medical and other experts;

(iii) any other relevant papers;

(iv) a full set of any relevant pleadings to the extent that they have not already been filed in court.

(v) correspondence, files and attendance notes;

(b) where the claim is in respect of an additional liability only, such of the papers listed at (a) above, as are relevant to the issues raised by the claim for additional liability;

(c) where the claim is for both base costs and an additional liability, the papers listed at (a) above, together with any papers relevant to the issues raised by the claim for additional liability.

CPD 40.11 does not. That part says:

Unless the court directs otherwise the receiving party must file with the court the papers in support of the bill not less than 7 days before the date for the detailed assessment hearing and not more than 14 days before that date.

When do the documents referred to in CPD 40.12 get filed, if at all? I heard a rumour that the provisional assessment would be done without the file but the fact CPD 40.12 remains in place seems to suggest the opposite.

Leeds assessment pilot – costs lawyer bonanza?

Previously we considered whether the Leeds detailed assessment pilot (click link) would reduce the judicial and court time spent dealing with costs disputes.  The new rules can be viewed here: County Court Provisional Assessment Pilot Scheme at Annex 2.

The next issue is whether provisional assessment will reduce the costs to the parties. Those costs practitioners worried that provisional assessment will reduce their fee income may not need to be too concerned just yet, even if the number of actual oral detailed assessments hearings reduces.

It will be recalled that Lord Justice Jackson was very clear that his proposed costs reforms were meant to be viewed as a complete package and should not be introduced on a piecemeal basis. The provisional assessment pilot is just such a piecemeal step.

Jackson LJ envisaged a much simplified bill of costs format. He envisaged different points of dispute and replies:

“Both points of dispute and points of reply need to be shorter and more focused. The practice of quoting passages from well known judgments should be abandoned. The practice of repeatedly using familiar formulae, in Homeric style, should also be abandoned. The pleaders on both sides should set out their contentions relevant to the instant cases clearly and concisely. There should be no need to plead to every individual item in a bill of costs, nor to reply to every paragraph in the points of dispute”.

The pilot scheme proceeds with these elements unaltered.

Such a scheme might have some chance of success in the Senior Courts Costs Office where, at least the full time, costs judges and costs officers are generally familiar with all the standard costs argument. It is less obvious that those judges sitting in Leeds, Scarborough and York County Courts will be as familiar with the intricacies of costs law. There is no suggestion that the provisional assessments will be conducted by any particular designated judge or regional costs judge. How knowledgeable are the district judges and deputy district judges who sit in these courts? This is not to suggest any shortcomings in the ability of these judges, but are they really all 100% up to speed on the minutiae of costs law?

I have been before judges on detailed assessment where they were convinced that “base costs” only refers to base profit costs.

I have been before a regional costs judge where the CFA in question was held to be invalid. I proceeded to explain that the consequence of this was that all disbursements would be disallowed except to the extent that they had been paid “up-front” by the claimant, whether personally or by way of a loan. The judge asked for the authority for this proposition. I referred the judge to paragraphs 113-116 and 223 of Hollins v Russell [2003] EWCA Civ. 718). The judge was not prepared to accept that this is what the relevant passages meant and adjourned the issue for detailed skeleton arguments to be served.

When much of the judiciary is not 100% familiar with every element of costs law – and why should they be expected to be? – the problems with provisional assessment become clear.

If I am faced with a claim for communications with an ATE provider I currently may deal with this in the points of dispute as briefly as:

“Not inter partes. Disallow.”

For the small number of cases that reach as far as detailed assessment I can worry nearer the time which authorities to wheel out in support of this argument.

If a matter might now be heard in one of the pilot courts by way of provisional assessment, is a costs draftsman/costs lawyer going to be content to draft such a concise dispute and hope the judge is already familiar with all the relevant case law (in the way one might expect in the SCCO)? Very risky.

Will it be sufficient to draft a dispute along the following lines referring to the relevant authorities:

“The Defendant submits that time spent discussing/arranging funding is not chargeable inter partes and refers to the cases of Re Claims Direct Test Cases [2002] EWHC 9002 (Costs), Masters –v- Hewden Stuart Heavy Lifting Limited, Leeds County Court, 18/3/05 and Woolley v Haden Building Services Ltd (No 2) [2008] EWHC 90111 (Costs). Disallow.”

With the provisional assessment process being envisaged to take approximately 45 minutes (apparently), can one expect a judge to take the time to track down various unreported decisions, quoted in points of dispute, and work his or her way through them to find the relevant paragraphs and extract the principle? Very unlikely.

Do those drafting points of dispute have any real alternative other than including lengthy quotes from the relevant authority on every point in case the judge is not familiar with the issue? What might have previously been a four word dispute may turn into a four page dispute.

When faced with points of dispute resembling skeleton arguments, is the receiving party going to decide they do not need to serve optional replies? Not a chance.

Are receiving parties going to be content to deal with the dispute above by simply saying:

“Not agreed.”

Will they be content to respond simply by referring to the names of the authorities which go the other way?

When faced with comprehensive points of dispute the receiving party will respond in kind.

Even if the paying party initially keeps their points of dispute relatively brief, when faced with the inevitable weighty tome served by the receiving party they will feel obliged to serve amended lengthy points of dispute in response. The automatic right to amend points of dispute and replies (CPD 40.10) remains in the provisional assessment process.

CPD 4.5 states:

“The background information included in the bill of costs should set out:

(1) a brief description of the proceedings up to the date of the notice of commencement”

As things stand, there are those who struggle to keep the description “brief”. With a provisional assessment there will be no chance to orally explain any particular problems with the way the claim proceeded. There will be no way of knowing to what extent the judge will read the papers in detail, if at all. One of Lord Justice Jackson’s proposals, in his final report, was for bills of costs to “provide more transparent explanation than is currently provided about what work was done in the various time periods and why [emphasis added]”. I previously expressed my concerns about this change to the bill of costs format (click clink). I can see this provisional assessment pilot encouraging much more of the “why” without any of the corresponding costs saving that Jackson LJ envisaged.

There is about to be an arms race in relation to the length of preambles to bills of costs and the complexity of points of dispute and replies, and all in the name of reducing the costs of assessment.

Would a law costs draftsman/costs lawyer who fails to comprehensively plead every single point available open themselves up to a negligence claim? Would they be negligent if they failed to serve amended/supplemental pleadings in light of lengthy points pleaded by the other side?

This is going to be a costs building bonanza for those involved in costs until the pilot scheme is hastily amended. Would claimant solicitors kindly ensure they issue all their cases out of Leeds, Scarborough or York for the foreseeable future?

Law costs draftsmen and competency

Yesterday we examined what amounts to a “competent” law costs draftsman from the receiving party’s perspective. Today we will look at this from the paying party’s view point.

From the paying party’s perspective, the key criteria are similar as for a receiving party’s costs draftsman:

1. The ability to recognise that there may be problems with the retainer. Although a paying party will have less to work with, the scope for potential challenge is vast, with the various complex rules and regulations that surround this area. If a law costs draftsman fails to spot a potential breach, that would have meant all costs might have been disallowed, can they be described as “competent”?

2. The ability to identify all the potential “routine” challenges. For those who do not work in the field of legal costs it is probably hard to imagine quite how endless these can be. At the last ALCD examination, one of the questions required the drafting of points of dispute based on a sample bill of costs. From memory, the receiving party was meant to be a limited company. As such, VAT was wrongly claimed in the bill. Costs Lawyer magazine, commenting on the examination results said:

“many candidates (Associate and Fellowship) missed the VAT point. [This point was] fundamental to the job we do as costs draftsmen and costs lawyers. … An understanding of VAT is therefore vital to any successful costs draftsman or costs lawyer.”

The article did not go on to detail whether any of the candidates who failed to spot this issue were nevertheless passed at Associate or Fellowship level (shortly, if not already, to be granted Costs Lawyer status). Failing to spot this issue in real life would almost certainly lead to a professional negligence claim. “Competent”?

3. The same level of advocacy skill as should be expected from a receiving party’s costs draftsman. The irony of this test of “competence” is that there will be costs draftsmen who wouldn’t on any proper test be described as “competent” but nevertheless routinely “win” detailed assessments because the quality of the submissions made are often irrelevant to the outcome.

4. The ability to recognise when a bill of costs has been drafted in a fundamentally flawed manner. This will be particularly important in relation to the difficult areas of apportionment and division. How often is it not even recognised that such an issue arises?

The Association of Law Costs Draftsmen will need to think carefully as to what it means to be “competent” and how this is to be measured for those now being granted Costs Lawyer status.

Competent law costs draftsmen

The Association of Law Costs Draftsmen, when responding to concerns about the recent changes being made to the membership structure and qualification requirements, stated:

“The rights which [the ALCD] will regulate include rights of audience and rights to provide legal services, and may in due course include the right to practise reserved legal activities. This means that the relevant test has to be one of competence, not excellence. The ALCD would be failing in its duty to entrants and the public if it were to set the bar so high that only a select few could clear it.”

The relevant test being “competence, not excellence” is clearly correct. The Bar does not expect junior barristers to have the skill and knowledge of a QC. Unfortunately, this test does no more than beg the question as to what amounts to “competence” for those acting in the field of legal costs.

The fact that a newly qualified solicitor or barrister may be “allowed” to handle a murder trial or a catastrophic clinical negligence brain injury claim does not mean they should. One would hope they would have the sense to turn the instructions down, on the basis of lack of experience, given the importance of the matter. The same should apply to costs (although whether those of us who work in this field have already disqualified ourselves, in terms of having “sense”, is another matter).

In fact, the examples of a murder trial or catastrophic injury are perhaps misleading. Those types of claim are immediately obvious to identify, as are their importance and potential complexities. (Barristers also have the benefit of a clerk to act as an initial filter for cases out of the barrister’s depth.)

The position in relation to those who work in the field of legal costs is less straightforward. The ALCD’s stated aim is to have its members able to “deal with the vast majority of costs disputes without the assistance of counsel”.

From the perspective of those who act for the receiving party, there appear to be four key elements to competence:

1. The ability to recognise, when instructed to deal with a new case, that there may be problems with the retainer. This has many potential strands:

i. If the CFA pre-dates the revocation of the Conditional Fee Agreement Regulations 2000, is there a potential breach?

ii. If the CFA post-dates the revocation, is there still potentially a breach of primary CFA statute. (Yes, this is still a problem. I have already had one post-revocation CFA struck down as invalid by a Regional Costs Judge. The other week I had another case settle at the door of the court with the claimant taking a heavy hit to reflect the fact the CFA was potentially defective. There are plenty of others out there.)

iii. Are there potential problems caused by complicated rules surrounding retainers not made at the solicitors’ offices? How many of those working in the field of legal costs are really 100% up to speed on this?

iv. I previously mentioned Cook on Costs 2010, page 438, reporting on a Costs Practitioners’ Group meeting at the SCCO “whose view was that while Grade D fee earners might be able to draw straightforward bills of under £10,000, all other bills ought to be drafted by a Grade C fee earner, since costs are a technical matter, and matters such as the operation of the indemnity principle need more experience than a Grade D fee earner is likely to possess”. (I am note sure the Group really did say this but it is clearly Cook on Costs’ view.) The question of whether there ultimately has been a breach of the indemnity principle – eg is any given CFA invalid – may well be a complex and unpredictable question. However, the basic indemnity principle should not be complex to understand and, in my view, those who have not grasped the principle within the first few days of starting to be taught legal costs law have no place practising in costs at any level. Nevertheless, the fact that a work such as Cook on Costs expresses this view does suggest that there probably are some working in the field of legal costs who do not understand the indemnity principle (and I fear this may be correct) and really does beg the question as to what we are to judge “competence” by.

2. The ability to recognise a serious challenge when it is raised in points of dispute. At that stage it may be necessary to seek assistance from someone more experienced/specialised. Unfortunately, experience suggests that the seriousness of a challenge, to a retainer for example, is often not appreciated until a day or two before a detailed assessment hearing, when the matter is presumably referred up the chain. Worse, sometimes the seriousness of the challenge is not appreciated until the end of the detailed assessment when costs have been disallowed in their entirety. At this stage the receiving party has to purse the unsatisfactory course of trying to appeal the matter and bring in specialist costs counsel.

3. The ability to deal with any of the unexpected arguments that can arise during a detailed assessment hearing. This can arise in all types of advocacy and is the cornerstone of the “competent” advocate. This is not a skill that comes easily, except to a gifted few, and the limited amount of advocacy that the majority of us undertake in the role of law costs draftsmen brings limited opportunity to learn by experience. As a reader commented on a previous post: “the young barrister is in court almost every day, perfecting his craft. How can costs draftsmen compete?”.

4. The ability to properly draft a bill of costs. (I’m not just talking about claiming the correct VAT rate). Issues such as apportionment or division of costs, where there were a number of defendants, or where there are unusual costs orders, can be very complicated. Obviously, sometimes a bill is simply drafted in the most favourable way for the receiving party and arguments are awaited as to why it might be wrong. However, I am sure that bills are often drafted on a fundamentally wrong basis because the costs draftsman has not understood there is even an issue to address. When challenges are raised, the defect with the bill is still not understood.

Tomorrow we’ll look at “competence” from the paying party’s perspective.

Leeds detailed assessment pilot

The last of Jackson LJ’s Civil Costs Review Seminars was concerned with the detailed assessment procedure. There was overwhelming, if not unanimous, support for the introduction of provisional assessments of costs on paper.

In the recent Written Ministerial Statement by Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Jonathan Djanogly MP), confirming that the Government planned to press ahead with the Jackson proposals, it was announced that there were a range of continuing judiciary-led costs and case management work including a “pilot of assessing disputed costs under £25,000 on the papers rather than at a hearing, in Leeds, Scarborough and York County Courts from October 2010”.

The new rules relating to the pilot scheme are incorporated in the 53rd CPR Update and will run from 1 October 2010 to 30 September 2011.

The first thing to note is that the pilot applies to cases where the base costs are £25,000 or less. With success fees and ATE premiums this will catch a large number of claims. It is not immediately obvious from the new rules whether the onus will be on the receiving party to specifically request the provisional assessment or whether someone at the court will be sitting there with a calculator to check the level of base costs is above or below £25,000. If the onus is on the receiving party, it is not clear what the sanction, if any, would be for getting this wrong.

The aim of the new scheme is clearly twofold:

1. Reduce the amount of court time taken up by detailed assessment hearings.

2. Reduce the high costs to the parties that are currently incurred in relation to fully contested detailed assessment hearings.

It is worth exploring the likely success of the pilot scheme in achieving these aims.

Apparently, the current thinking is that it is estimated that under the pilot scheme it should only take the judge about 45 minutes to review the documents provided and come to a decision. This is clearly significantly faster than the time taken currently in relation to detailed assessment hearings where much longer is needed for even the lowest value and most straightforward claim. There are, however, a number of potential problems.

At the last of the Jackson Review Costs Seminars, hosted by the Supreme Court Costs Office Practitioners’ Group and Reed Smith LLP, there were only two dissenting voices to the idea of provisional paper assessments. One was a regional costs judge and the other was a principal costs officer. Their concern was that such a process would lead to an unmanageable surge in detailed assessments that would overwhelm the courts. Far from reducing the amount of time the courts spent dealing with costs matters, it would have the opposite effect.

Currently, the detailed assessment route is an expensive one. With lower value claims the costs of detailed assessment can outweigh the costs of the substantive claim. Even on no more than medium sized bills, the detailed assessment costs can easily run into five figures. Therefore, parties, or at least those properly advised, will be reluctant to proceed down this route if it can be avoided. With the provisional assessment, the only cost that will be incurred, beyond the costs of Points of Dispute and any Replies already incurred, will be the court fee. The court fee for bills that do not exceed £15,000 is £300. For bills which exceed £15,000 but do not exceed £50,000 the fee is £600. Either party can therefore obtain a provisional assessment for a bill of up to £50,000 for no more than £600. This is certainly set at a level where the costs of assessment are unlikely to act as a disincentive, unlike the current level of costs.

A large number of cases currently settle after the matter has been listed for an assessment hearing but before the actual hearing. This is often only a day or two before the hearing. No doubt this is usually caused by the approaching hearing suddenly focusing the minds of those involved. Even a very late settlement will avoid the majority of the assessment costs. The judiciary routinely complain about late settlements of costs disputes. (This is a routine occurrence in substantive litigation as well, of course.) In reality, it is probably only because of late settlements that judges are able to keep on top of some of their paperwork. If late settlements did not occur, the courts would probably grind to a halt.

With the provisional assessment process will there be any incentive on parties to review and try to settle costs in advance of hearings? The court fee will already have been incurred and no further saving will be available. There is certainly every possibility that parties will be more likely to request assessments in the first place and then less likely to look to compromise matters before the assessment has actually occurred.

The second problem is that there is an automatic right to seek a full oral detailed assessment if either party is unhappy with the provisional assessment. Given it appears that there will be no reasons given for reductions made, or not made, to bills, there has to be a real possibility that there will be just as many full detailed assessments as there are presently. The worst case scenario is that the courts are faced with a large number of provisional assessments that they did not previously have to deal with and no reduction in the number of full assessment hearings.

Whether the provisional assessment pilot increases or decreases the workload of the courts remains to be seen.

We’ll examine the other issues on another day.
 

Costs Counsel v Costs Lawyer – Round Two

Not long ago I commented on the perceived differences in the skills of specialist costs counsel compared with costs lawyers and concluded that the latter could not realistically expect to compete with the former.  The comments that were made on the post suggest that I am not alone in this view.

You can therefore imagine the sense of irony I felt in relation to the telephone call I received a day or two later from a defendant solicitor client.

They had previously instructed specialist costs counsel to attend a detailed assessment hearing.  Unfortunately, the bill of costs had been assessed for a few pounds more than the defendant’s offer and the the claimant had therefore been awarded the costs of the detailed assessment hearing.

Now, losing by a small margin is not exactly unknown in costs matters but there were one or two unfortunate features:

1. The defendant had made an offer before the bill of costs was drafted.  Excluding the costs of drafting the bill, the defendant would have won comfortably on the offer (see Forward v Burton [2005] EWHC 90003 (Costs)).  Counsel failed to argue this point.

2. The bill had been correctly drafted, at the time, claiming VAT at 15%.  The defendant’s offer had been based on 15% VAT.  No request had been made to amend the VAT claim in the bill.  Apparently, or at least so the court subsequently ruled, the defendant’s counsel had agreed VAT at 17.5% when doing the calculations with the other side outside court.  No attempt had been made to argue that consideration of whether the original offer had been successful should have been based on the VAT rate that applied when the offer had been made.  This made the difference between winning and losing. 

The barrister in question shall remain nameless but, from my limited experience of being against him in court, is a gifted junior (as specialist costs counsel almost invariably are).  So what went wrong?

I suspect this was a typical example of the potential limitations and drawbacks of relying on specialist costs counsel.  Or, at least, relying solely on costs counsel.

Specialist costs counsel are often fiendishly clever when it comes to arguing complex and novel points of costs law but often have much less of a grip on the rough-and-tumble of day-to-day disputes.  Issues that are, or at least should be, bread-and-butter for law costs draftsmen are ones that costs counsel are often far less familiar with because they tend to be instructed to deal just with the big issues, such as CFA compliance, rather than run-of-the-mill detailed assessments.  I know a number of costs counsel who would immediately agree that this is correct and often prefer to have a costs draftsman attend a detailed assessment with them to deal with the routine arguments.  The drawback with this, of course, is the extra cost of having both attend with every chance the judge will only allow the fees of one.

So, I’m now going to have to refine what I said before.  Costs counsel will generally be far more appropriate to instruct to deal with complex legal costs arguments and for cost appeals.  Law costs draftsmen/costs lawyers may be better for routine detailed assessments and, sometimes, to assist costs counsel on cases that span both complex and routine issues (even if you shouldn’t expect to recover two sets of fees). 

To add to the problem faced by instructing solicitors, they often have to rely on their costs draftsman/lawyer to advise them on whether there is indeed a problem complex enough to merit involving specialist costs counsel.  I’ve seen enough cases to know that sometimes this is only appreciated during the middle of the detailed assessment when the costs draftsman/lawyer finds themselves floundering.  Or worse, at the end of the assessment hearing when it has all gone horribly wrong.

Getting inside the mind of a costs judge

The Legal Costs Blog has been a bit quite over the last few days. This is because I’ve been on holiday in sunny Turkey. Indeed, I’m writing this post lying on a sun-lounger by the pool with the laptop precariously balanced on my stomach and with a drink on the table beside me with an extra long straw to avoid any danger of accidentally performing a sit-up.

However, my time has not been entirely wasted with my holiday reading material.

In a previous post I commented on the problem that costs judges face in that the only bills of costs they are likely to see are the most unreasonable ones. Reasonable bills almost invariably settle. Judges perception of what is “normal” is formed by the most unusual bills that come their way.

The following comes from Kevin Dutton’s fascinating book Flipnosis.

Ask a colleague the following question:

How many litres of diesel does it take to fill up a jumbo jet? Is it more of less than 500?

Now ask another colleague the same question with a subtle twist:

How many litres of diesel does it take to fill up a jumbo jet? Is it more of less than 500,000?

Then ask each of them to give a concrete estimate of how many litres of diesel it really does take to fill up a jumbo yet.

Almost inevitably, the first person will give a lower estimate than the second person, and probably by a very large margin. The reason for this is something called anchoring. Both colleagues will quite literally use the numbers you put in their head (500 or 500,000) as their frame of reference – anchoring points – on which to base their judgements.

Dutton’s books goes on to describe how this concept of anchoring influences even judges, as shown in a study by German psychologists Birte Englich, Fritz Strack and Thomas Mussweiler:

“The team took a group of experienced judges and asked them to read an outline of a case. The case involved a man who’d been convicted of rape. Once they’d familiarised themselves with the details, the judges where then divided into two groups. One group were to imagine the following: that while the court was adjourned, they received, in their chambers, a telephone call from a journalist. This journalist posed them the following question: Would the sentence be higher or lower than three years? The other group were presented with a slightly different scenario. They, too, were told that they’d received a telephone call from a journalist – only in this case the journalist would enquire whether or not the sentence would be higher or lower than one year. … [T]he average length of sentence handed down by the judges in the first group was 33 months. In the second, it was 25.”

Strangely, Dutton fails to follow this up by exploring the relevance of this concept to the world of legal costs and I will therefore have to take the baton and run with it.

One of the areas that my firm, Gibbs Wyatt Stone, specialises in is legal costs in catastrophic injury claims. Lets take a typical catastrophic injury claim (if there is such a thing) that settles shortly before trial. A bill of costs is presented claiming 150 hours on documents. Hopefully we can all agree that 150 hours is too much, although, depending on the facts of the case, this may not be outrageous for this type of claim. So what would a judge allow adopting a broad-brush approach?

With high value costs claims there is no real sensible way of dealing with the document time other than on a broad-brush basis. With the current bill of costs format, work done on, for example, drafting the claimant’s witness statement, will often be scattered over various dates throughout the document schedule. Trying to deal with this on an item-by-item basis is a lost cause. When drafting points of dispute I will often try to total the time claimed to see how long has been spent on a specific task in total. If this totals, for example, 20 hours on the claimant’s witness statement, then a judge can begin to consider whether this is reasonable given the length of the final statement. However, in general, a broad-brush approach to the document time is often the only way to sensibly proceed.

So, given my example of a total of 150 hours for such a claim, what can we expect the court to allow? Members of the judiciary who are reading this can play along at home. I’m going to suggest a likely figure of somewhere between, 120-130 hours.

Now, let’s play the game again with a case with the same facts but with a bill claiming 400 hours on documents. We all should be able to agree that this would usually be a silly amount of time. But what would the court allow? Acting for defendants, I would think I had done rather well if the court reduced this to 200 hours. That is not to say that I would consider 200 hours to be a reasonable figure but rather that, in my experience, it is very rare for a judge to reduce document time by more than 50%. I previously put this down to a reluctance on the part of judges to make a finding that virtually amounted to a finding of gross incompetence on the part of the solicitors (because the time spent was more than twice what a competent firm would have taken) or a finding of fraud (more time was being claimed than had actually been spent). I now think that the anchoring concept may be playing a part. The bigger the figure first claimed, the more likely it is that a large figure will be allowed. The amount claimed acts as the anchoring point in the costs judge’s mind.

The courts do appear to be willing to allow much higher overall figures on the most excessive bills than they ever would allow on the more reasonable ones. Ironically, the more reasonable the bill of costs presented, the less the firm will probably recover. The more outrageous the claim, the bigger the final award is likely to be. If costs judges and costs officers are likely to suffer from this problem, despite their experience, how much worse will this be for less experienced district judges? Other than the anchor of what is claimed, what do they have to help them determine what a reasonable figure is? Judges need to take an extra critical view of the largest bills and avoid worrying that they may be being too harsh simply because the size of the reduction looks very large.

Is Jackson already happening?

Not all of the proposals contained in Lord Justice Jackson’s Review of Civil Litigation Costs require primary legislation.  One of the intriguing questions is the extent to which the judiciary will quietly introduce some of his ideas.

Andrew Parker, writing in the New Law Journal, said: "Anecdotally one or two County Courts are already taking steps to apply some of the ideas on fast track costs".

I haven’t had enough cases proceed to detailed assessment yet to form any view.  Have any readers begun to see Jackson influencing the courts already?

51st Update to the CPR – 4

More on the 51st Update to the Civil Procedure Rules. The changes came into force on 6 April 2010. The big changes relate to CPD 32.5 and the documents to be served with a bill where there is an additional liability.  These changes are to finally get the rules up to speed with the revocation of the Conditional Fee Agreement Regulations 2000 and Collective Conditional Fee Agreement Regulations 2000.

These merit being recited in full:

(b) where the conditional fee agreement was entered into before 1st November 2005, a statement of the reasons for the percentage increase given in accordance with regulation 3(1)(a) of the Conditional Fee Agreements Regulations 2000 or regulation 5(1)(c) of the Collective Conditional Fee Agreements Regulations 2000 [Both sets of regulations were revoked by the Conditional Fee Agreements (Revocation) Regulations 2005 but continue to have effect in relation to conditional fee agreements and collective conditional fee agreements entered into before 1st November 2005.];

(c) where the conditional fee agreement was entered into on or after 1st November 2005 (except in cases where the percentage increase is fixed by CPR Part 45, sections II to V), either a statement of the reasons for the percentage increase or a copy of the risk assessment prepared at the time that the conditional fee agreement was entered into;

(d) if the conditional fee agreement is not disclosed (and the Court of Appeal has indicated that it should be the usual practice for a conditional fee agreement, redacted where appropriate, to be disclosed for the purpose of costs proceedings in which a success fee is claimed), a statement setting out the following information contained in the conditional fee agreement so as to enable the paying party and the court to determine the level of risk undertaken by the solicitor-

(i) the definition of ‘win’ and, if applicable, ‘lose’;

(ii) details of the receiving party’s liability to pay costs if that party wins or loses; and

(iii) details of the receiving party’s liability to pay costs if that party fails to obtain a judgment more advantageous than a Part 36 offer.

There are no doubt a number of claimant representatives who are struggling to understand the section in brackets that says: “the Court of Appeal has indicated that it should be the usual practice for a conditional fee agreement, redacted where appropriate, to be disclosed for the purpose of costs proceedings in which a success fee is claimed”.  When did the Court of Appeal say that?  In Hollins v Russell [2003] EWCA Civ 718.

Given the reluctance of so many claimants to disclose their CFAs I can only assume that there are a significant number of claimant representatives out there who fall into one of three categories:

1. Those who have never heard of Hollins v Russell.

2. Those who have heard of it but haven’t bothered to read it.

3. Those who have heard of the case and have read it but didn’t understand all the long words.

Doesn’t Hollins v Russell say that a CFA should only be disclosed it there is a “genuine reason”?

No.  No.  No.

The case considered disclosure of two types of document.  The first type was the CFA itself.  That should normally be disclosed (see paragraph 80).  On the other hand, attendance notes only need to be disclosed if there is a “genuine issue as to whether there was compliance with regulation 4” (paragraph 81).  The distinction between the two is made clear at paragraph 220:

“So far as matters of procedure are concerned, we consider that it should become normal practice for a CFA to be disclosed for the purpose of costs proceedings in which a success fee is claimed. … Attendance notes and other correspondence should not ordinarily be disclosed, but the judge conducting the assessment may require the disclosure of material of this kind if a genuine issue is raised. A genuine issue is one in which there is a real chance that the CFA is unenforceable as a result of failure to satisfy the applicable conditions.”

For completeness, here is paragraph 82:

“Although the procedure envisages that the costs judge will put a party to her election as to the disclosure of the CFA, now that it is clear from our judgment in this case that this is to be the general practice, we hope that receiving parties will disclose the CFA without more ado. It would obviously lead to further costs and delay if receiving parties were to take an unreasonable view on this issue.”

So, the next time you are asked to disclose a copy of your CFA don’t refuse on the basis that the defendant has failed to raise a genuine issue.  You just make yourself look stupid.

The interesting thing to note about the new rules is that they sensibly state that a statement of reasons or risk assessment does not need to be served for CFAs entered into on or after 1 November 2005 where the success fee is fixed by CPR Part 45, sections II to V.  However, there is no corresponding concession for CFAs entered into pre-1 November 2005.  Even if the case is subject to fixed success fees, if the CFA/CCFA pre-dates 1 November 2005 (which with CCFAs will usually be the case) there is still a requirement to serve the relevant statement.  And will all know what the consequence is of failing to follow the rules properly.